Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

We investigate the optimal response of unemployment insurance to economic shocks, both with and without commitment. The … transitory increase in UI is optimal; and that a policy rule contingent on the change in unemployment, rather than its level, is …

We study unemployment insurance in a framework where the main source of heterogeneity among agents is the type of … aggregate wealth moments. Our central finding is that changes to the current unemployment insurance program are valued … differently by married and single households. In particular, a more generous unemployment insurance reduces the welfare of married …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

Persistent unemployment after recessions and the policies required to bring it down are the subject of an ongoing … unemployment, requiring the implementation of structural policy reforms. The alternative view is that the slow recovery of the … economy is due to cyclic reasons coming from lack of demand which prevents unemployment from falling quickly. Knowing whether …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

background of unemployment insurance. We find that unemployment insurance is always efficiently organized by decentral decisions … be shown to be generically inefficient because the decision makers either externalize the cost of unemployment via the …

We ran a large randomized controlled experiment among about 150,000 recipients of unemployment benefits insurance in … France in order to evaluate the impact of part-time unemployment benefits. We took advantage of the lack of knowledge of job … impact on the propensity to work while on claim, but reduced the unemployment exit rate, showing important lock-in effects …