We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job … search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of … benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate. …

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job … search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of … benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness absence during …

reduction of unemployment benefits on the other reduce unemployment? Using the recent labour market reform in Germany as … background we find that the role of unemployment benefit reduction for the reduction of unemployment is very modest (7% of the … the observed post-reform unemployment decline. If disincentive effects of PEA reforms had been avoided, the effect could …