We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 ("Pre-Bosman" or P), currently in use ("Bosman" or B), and recently approved ("Monti" or M) differ with...

We revisit the incentive effects of elimination tournaments with a fresh approach to identification, the results of which strongly support that performance improves under the threat of elimination and does so, but only in part, due to increases in risk taking. Where we can separately identify...

Past studies estimating the marginal revenue products of baseball players have assumed individual players' hitting performances to be independent of teammate spillovers. However, the baseball community's widely held belief in "protection" - that a good (bad) player can improve (diminish) the hit...

Systems of transfer fees can be designed in different ways. Their effects have been analysed in detail, particularly in connection with the Bosman-ruling. However, the analyses were only conducted on a microeconomic level and therefore limited to one player and two clubs, one club taking the...

Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football...

I propose two universal measurements of competitive imbalance. The first is, like those in the existing literature, based on team season win-loss records. The second is based solely on the outcomes of the various series of individual match- ups during a season. Both measures will on average...