The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the...

We develop a model of spatial competition to explore how changes in the market structure affect the incentives of banks to screen loan applicants. We take a post-crisis perspective that treats the number of banks as exogenous. Our findings reveal that the relaxation of competition distorts...

During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or received financial aid thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. We contribute to the early warning literature by constructing a dynamic competing risks hazard model that explores the joint...

In this paper, we construct a spatial model of banking competition that considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers to investigate how the market structure affects the lending behavior of banks and their incentives to invest in screening technology. Consistent with...