We provide a systematic analysis of fiscal consolidation in a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model. Our results show that the choice of the consolidation instrument is very important, not only with respect to the short- and long-run output effects of the different consolidation...

This paper explores the political economy of fiscal adjustment. It begins with an examination of the evidence for, and sources of, ‘deficit bias', including political and governance factors, public attitudes, the role of financial markets and imprecision about which debt targets should be...

This paper explores the political economy of fiscal adjustment. It begins with an examination of the evidence for, and sources of, ‘deficit bias’, including political and governance factors, public attitudes, the role of financial markets and imprecision about which debt targets should be...

We provide a systematic analysis of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a detailed government sector and a share of credit-constrained households. We simulate permanent cuts in government consumption, government investment, and transfer payments as well as permanent...

How should public debt be managed when uncertainty about the business cycle is widespread and debt levels are high, as in the aftermath of the last financial crisis? This paper analyzes optimal fiscal policy with ambiguity aversion and endogenous government spending. We show that, without...

We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households, namely Rich and Poor, and capital skill complementarity structure in the production function, to study aggregate and distributional implications of fiscal consolidation policies when the government uses a rich set of...

Should a government have more than one fiscal rule constraining fiscal aggregates? If so, why? In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy featuring an incumbent government to assess how and why implementing a budget balance rule and a debt anchor rule...

We discuss two essential problems of the political economy of public finances: The principal agent problem between voters and elected politicians and the common pool problem arising from the fact that money drawn from a general tax fund is used to pay for policies targeting more or less narrow...