This paper investigates the information spillover effect of government bailouts. Analyzing money market funds' dynamic enrollment status in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program in 2008, this paper finds that enrolled funds had overall positive fund flows, implying that the stability...

We analyze how the inflow of liquidity through TARP funds in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis impacted banks' interbank market activity. We show that TARP banks increased interbank market activity statistically and economically in a very significant way. Their interbank lending...

Between October 28, 2008 and June 30, 2009 over six hundred banks and bank holding companies accepted money from the United States government in exchange for preferred shares and warrants. Based on a matched sample of banks participating and not participating in this Capital Purchase Program...

Bank bailouts are not the "one-shot" events commonly described in the literature. These bailouts are instead dynamic processes in which regulators "catch" financially distressed banks; "restrict" their activities over time; and "release" the banks from restrictions at sufficiently healthy capital...

This paper proposes a quantitative theory of the interaction between private and public debt in an open economy. Excessive private debt increases the frequency of financial crises. During such crises the government provides fiscal bailouts financed with risky public debt. This response may cause...

What type of fiscal policy is most effective during a financial crisis? I study the macroeconomic effects of the US fiscal policy response to the Great Recession, accounting not only for standard tools such as government purchases and transfers but also for financial sector interventions such as...

This paper develops a debt-run model to study the effects of liquidity injections on debt markets in the presence of a renegotiation option. In the model, creditors decide when to withdraw their funding and equityholders can renegotiate the contract terms of debt. We show that when equityholders...