We propose an equilibrium model for defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with 'fragile beliefs' are uncertain about the underlying economic state and its probability. Estimation on sovereign European CDS data shows that agents require a...

We propose an equilibrium model for defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with "fragile beliefs'' are uncertain about the underlying economic state and its probability. Estimation on sovereign European credit default swaps (CDS) data shows that...

We propose a tractable equilibrium model for pricing defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with 'fragile beliefs' are uncertain about both the underlying state of the economy and the posterior probabilities associated with these states. As such,...

The 1987 market crash was associated with a dramatic and permanent steepening of the implied volatility curve for equity index options, despite minimal changes in aggregate consumption. We explain these events within a general equilibrium framework in which expected endowment growth and economic...

We propose an equilibrium model for defaultable bonds that are subject to contagion risk. Contagion arises because agents with "fragile beliefs"' are uncertain about the underlying economic state and its probability. Estimation on sovereign European credit default swaps (CDS) data shows that...

We investigate optimal capital structure and debt maturity policies in the presence of fixed issuance costs. We identify the global-optimal policy that generates the highest values of equity across all states of nature consistent with limited liability. The optimal policy without commitment...

We propose a tractable model of a firm's dynamic debt and equity issuance policies in the presence of asymmetric information. Because "investment-grade" firms can access debt markets, managers who observe a bad private signal can both conceal this information and shield shareholders from...

We propose a tractable bond pricing model in which managers have an informational advantage over creditors. We show that, regardless of how poor their private signal is, managers of firms that can access the credit market will avoid default by issuing new debt to service existing debt....