In this study, we examine the effect of accrual-based earnings management on the association between managers' earnings … forecast errors and accruals, which we label “managers' accrual-related forecast bias.” We build on extensive research which … finds that managers engage in accrual-based earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and report smooth …

fixed costs offers companies flexibility in resource planning. However, we expect that higher-ability managers tend to adopt … a more rigid cost structure. This is because higher-ability managers are more likely to realize unusually high demand …, more able managers will attempt to retain higher capacity and choose more fixed inputs, leading to a more rigid cost …

the different roles of stock holdings and option holdings in solving agency problems, managers may smooth past earnings … holdings aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, and managers using discretionary accruals to smooth past earnings … risk-taking by managers, and managers use discretionary accruals to mask volatility of less predictable earnings. Thus, we …

We investigate if high-ability managers are more likely to intentionally smooth earnings, a form of earnings management …, and when they are more likely to do so. Although prior studies provide evidence that high-ability managers report higher …-ability managers' intentional smoothing activities. We find that (1) high-ability managers are significantly more likely to engage in …

rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and … in the reputation costs observed after a restatement, such that managers only reduce future bias if the observed cost of … based on more restatements. Our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve …

In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to … employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on … the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self …