Motivated by research in psychology and experimental economics, we assume that investors update their beliefs about an asset's value upon observing the price, but only when the price clearly reveals that others obtained private information that differs from their own private information....

Motivated by research in psychology and experimental economics, we assume that investors update their beliefs about an asset's value upon observing the price, but only when the price clearly reveals that others obtained private information that differs from their own private information. In...

We conduct a series of forecasting experiments to examine how people update their beliefs upon observing others' forecasts. We show that people insufficiently update their beliefs, and that this tendency is only partially explained by the better than average effect. We document that subjects...

We consider a two-stage game with an option to analyze disclosures in the first stage, and a coordination game in the second stage. Decision makers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their ability to comprehend disclosures—sophisticated players are likely to comprehend disclosures, while...