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Why does environmental policy in representative democracies tend to be inadequate? : a preliminary public choice analysis
Kollmann, Andrea; Schneider, Friedrich - 2010
. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation in the past decade the Public Choice theory is used. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699051
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Explaining institutional change : why elected politicians implement direct democracy
Hugh-Jones, David - 2008
the introduction of the initiative, referendum and recall in America broadly supports the theory, which also explains two … of institutional change more generally. -- Direct democracy ; institutional change ; referendum … creating these institutions. I build a model of direct democracy that explains why a representative might benefit from tying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796322
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On the possibility of democracy and rational collective choice
Hillinger, Claude - 2004
The paper challenges the "orthodox doctrine" of collective choice theory according to which Arrow's "general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440457
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Democracy, lobbying and economics
Žák, Milan - In: Národohospodářský obzor : časopis věnovaný … 19 (2019) 3, pp. 193-210
find answers to the problems in the current economic theory. The basic links are defined by using a simple graphic model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131482
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Exit polls and voter turnout
Andersen, Asger Lau; Jensen, Thomas - 2010
We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter turnout and election outcomes are affected by the publication of exit polls on election day. We find that the introduction of an exit poll influences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659212
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Anonymous, Neutral, and Resolute Social Choice Revisited
Ozkes, Ali - 2020
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840348
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Nonasymptotic Condorcet and Anti-Condorcet Jury Theorems under Strategic Voting
Nagaoka, Naruto - 2020
The nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem states that, under certain conditions, group decision-making by simple majority voting can decide more efficiently than single-person decision-making, in terms of having a higher probability of choosing the better alternative. Wit (1998) showed that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849943
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Fair and efficient collective decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus
Heitzig, Jobst; Simmons, Forest W. - 2021
Are there collective decision methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus and equality, rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242304
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Ambiguous social choice functions
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman - 2021 - This version: December 22, 2021
Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793453
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Who will vote quadratically? : voter turnout and votes cast under quadratic voting
Kaplow, Louis; Kominers, Scott Duke - 2016
Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core QV literature assumes that everyone votes, turnout is endogenous. Drawing on other work, we consider the representativeness of endogenously determined turnout under QV. Second,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578439