We consider loans being marked to market to constitute information about borrowing firms' profitability and risk only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors, so-called non-QIBs, do not have immediate access to such...

We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading,...

Speed hierarchy not only motivates fast trading competition on less precise information but also renders slower traders more informative. As a result, endogenous speed acquisition in equilibrium affects how information is produced and spread. When information diffusion is characterized by its...

This paper studies asset markets where buyers of assets do not inherit private information from previous owners and must learn asset quality over time. Imperfect information transmission reduces asymmetric information, but also reduces the trading volume, prices and efficiency. This result is...

The authors study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough. Upon introducing non-informed agents, the...

We develop a model to study the observability of investors' information acquisition in financial markets. Relative to observable information acquisition, unobservable information acquisition leads to more information production if and only if the ratio of the information-acquisition cost to...

How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading...

Recently exchanges have been directly selling market data. We analyze how this practice affects price discovery, the cost of capital, return volatility, and market liquidity. We show that selling price data increases the cost of capital and volatility, worsens market efficiency and liquidity,...

The current research assesses the risks commonly attributed to the presence of HFT in the context of different market structures deployed by the U.S. exchanges. In particular, we find that, by design, the so-called “normal” exchanges have the lowest market quality, including the highest...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case...