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Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
Brink, René van den; Núñez, Marina; Robles, Francisco - 2018
). Finally, adding a consistency axiom, the two optimal rules are characterized in the general domain of allocation rules for two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901866
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House allocation with overlapping agents : a dynamic mechanism design approach
Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for …, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping agents. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two …-proofness. We provide another simple dynamic mechanism that is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. -- house allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883281
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House allocation with overlapping generations
Kurino, Morimitsu - 2011 - First Draft: October 2008, This Draft: May 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152626
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Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange
Zhang, Jun - 2020
In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839675
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Endowments-Swapping-Proof House Allocation
Fujinaka, Yuji - 2018
We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921955
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Incentives and Implementation in Allocation Problems with Externalities
Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée - 2020
We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824212
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Centralized Course Allocation
Romero-Medina, Antonio - 2018
We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913506
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Pre-Exchange-Proof House Allocation
Fujinaka, Yuji - 2017
We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012961731
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A New Ex-Ante Efficiency Criterion and Implications for the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
Doğan, Battal - 2017
We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969319
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Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation
Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - 2022
We present the conditional acceptance mechanism for the course allocation problem. This mechanism combines features of … Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable preferences and priorities. We model the post-allocation …-of-equilibrium play and implements the set of stable allocation in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium under slot-specific preferences and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029967