Job rotation, where a principal routinely rotates agents among tasks, is argued to be a powerful antidote for agency problems inside an organization. However, when soft information dominates transactions inside a firm, verifying the information set that led to a particular decision becomes...

I develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of risky entrepreneurs' borrowing and savings decisions incorporating both formal and local-informal credit markets. Households have access to an exogenous formal credit market and to an informal credit market in which the interest rate is...

Using quarterly financial statements data of listed firms during 2008-2016, this paper identifies the “borrow to lend” shadow banking activities of non-financial firms in China by examining the connection of key financial variables and investigates how liquidity shocks affect such...

Shadow banks had a negligible presence in the US corporate loan market in the 1990s, but by 2016 they funded about 45% of the outstanding corporate term loans. Consistent with banking theories on liquidity provision, shadow banks remained absent from the credit line business. Nonetheless, they...

We build a macro-finance model of shadow banking: the transformation of risky assets into securities that are money-like in quiet times but become illiquid when uncertainty spikes. Shadow banking economizes on scarce collateral, expanding liquidity provision in booms, boosting asset prices and...

This paper studies the effect of shadow banks on monetary aggregates, credit to private agents, and inter-financial institution transactions by incorporating shadow banks into a simple multiple deposit creation scheme. The simple scheme is carefully modified and extended to reflect leverages...

The majority of informal finance, in developed and developing countries, is provided by family and friends. Yet existing models of informal finance better fit “informal moneylenders” insomuch as they fail to match two salient characteristics of family finance: family investors often accept...

A theory predicts that loan pricing is less sensitive to public information, such as a credit score provided by a credit information vendor, if the lender obtains more accurate private information about the credit quality of borrowers. We find that loan pricing is less sensitive to public...

We study the asset pricing in shadow banking where banks with limited commitment provide liquidity to households by issuing collateralized bonds. These bonds earn a liquidity value and the collateral assets earn a collateral value. Both the supply and ownership of collateral matter for its...

We show empirically that public credit information increases competition in credit markets. We access data that cover all credit card borrowers in Chile and include details about relationship borrowers have with each lender. We exploit a natural experiment whereby a non-bank lender's portfolio...