politicians. Two political frictions (ideological adherence and a super- majority requirement) impair political competition and … lead to equilibria, where politicians receive corruption bribes. Furthermore, the model implies a non …

resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most …" which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians' and …

-checking company. Our results show that politicians are responsive to negative fact-checking. Specifically, we observe a significative … reduction in the number of incorrect statements made by politicians after being treated. This effect persists for at least two … months. We also observe a reduction in the probability of politicians making verifiable statements, suggesting that fact …

educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. …

educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. …

performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfareenhancing reforms. …

resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most …" which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians' and …

educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. …