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Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318646
Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224423
Credit-rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have … an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers … form a “double reputation.” The model extends the existing literature on “cheap-talk” reputation to the case of two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036167
This paper offers a systematic exploration of reputation mechanism design in trading environments with opportunistic …. The objective of reputation mechanisms in such settings is to induce sellers to exert high effort as often as possible. I … reputation profile, the policy regarding missing feedback, and the rules for admitting new sellers) on the resulting market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031061
Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881
Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has to retire even though ownership change is observable … good type. Hence reputation is tradeable, although ownership change is observable. In our model, reputation is an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449475
We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the … long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state that determines the monitoring structure in the reputation … sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and the type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990091
Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990092
can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the … absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives are explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market …, reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller’s ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine the extent to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203351
By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms in many online environments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212262