We consider a decentralized supply chain where a supplier sells goods to a retailer facing a general random demand over an infinite horizon. The retailer satisfies the demand to the extent of the inventory on hand. The retailer has private information about his inventory in each period and the...

In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider a market in which...

This paper revisits the model of the censored newsvendor presented by Ding, Puterman and Bisi (2002). We analyze that model in an infinite-horizon context by using the interesting concept of unnormalized probabilities. The unnormalized probabilities considerably simplify the dynamic programming...

Suppliers often make proactive investments in capacity to strategically position themselves to win a contract with a monopolist buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers' variable costs of serving the buyer's demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the...