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A value for directed communication situations
González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Gómez, … - 2008
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in … Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the … players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model the communication network by a directed graph and the cooperative game by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373812
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Pipeline power : a case study of strategic network investments ; conference paper
Hubert, Franz; Cobanli, Onur - 2014 - This version: January 2014
We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647
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On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games
Zou, Zhengxing; Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2024
We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505372
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A generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result
Kuipers, Jeroen; Vermeulen, Dries; Voorneveld, Mark - 2009
-Ichiishi result. Other applications range from computation of stable sets in non-cooperative game theory to determination of classes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809135
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An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form
Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Yang, Yi-You - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 475-487
theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we … average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). -- externalities ; marginal contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896
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On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives : the case of two-person NTU games
Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zarzuelo, José M. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 143-156
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506430
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Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
Casajus, André - 2011 - This version: September 19, 2011
We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23 …, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311608
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The balanced solution for co-operative transferable utility games
Brink, René van den; Levínský, René; Zeleny, Miroslav - 2007
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372977
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Consistency, monotonicity and implementation of egalitarian shapley values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372987
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Axiomatizations of two types of shapley values for games on union closed systems
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2009
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378792