characterizes China's state sector. The model demonstrates the nature of the bargain between the principals (i.e., officials from … China's State Asset Council) and the agents (large-SOE managers). We derive an indifference payoff point, which maximizes … party in the game. This condition helps to explain the inability of China's political economy system to privatize …

This paper considers the non-monotonic effect of the partial privatization campaign on the capital allocation … distortion of large SOEs in China by using the Chinese firm-level panel data. We construct a theoretical model to show that the … rise in the degree of partial privatization has the non-monotonic effect of removing the capital allocation distortion …

In the hierarchy of China's state sector, both before and during the current reform period, government bureaucrats …

of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Our model shows that the delegation of decision making authority to SOE … of the party-committee control within large SOEs in China …

"In revisiting the forty year history of reforms to China's state-owned enterprises (SOE), the book assesses the … that China's SOE reform not only commits to institutional innovation within the corporation in terms of operating … political economy and the Chinese economy, with particular reference to SOE reform and the recent economic transition in China." …

find that progress on small-scale privatization is associated with advances in several other reforms, perhaps because small …-scale privatization creates lobbies for reform. Our estimations suggest that a comprehensive program of small-scale privatization is … needed to stimulate large-scale privatization, trade, and banking reform in a country that has undertaken little reform …

improvement of people's welfare is the main cause of China's development miracle. Originality/value The innovation impetus of the …