This Article advances a novel theoretical model for assessing policy interventions against Facebook. As prosecutors barrel forward against digital platforms, soon it will fall upon courts and, eventually, regulators to devise remedies. We argue that any sensible solution must include...

Antitrust doctrine is under heavy fire in the academic literature. Modern criticism of antitrust doctrine attacks three ‘limits’ that would excessively constrain enforcement of the law: (i) the consumer welfare standard, (ii) the rule of reason, and (iii) a self-imposed neglect of labor...

We compare the short-run welfare effects of two types of settlement agreements, quot;reverse paymentsquot; of the brand-name drug makers to generic producers not to enter the market and delayed entry when these payments are restricted both under the entry injunction (imposed by the Hatch-Waxman...

The rise of big tech firms has steered contemporary antitrust law and policy debates toward concerns about leveraging and refusal to deal by digital platforms. Recent unilateral conduct cases and new legislative proposals for ex ante regulation target platforms that favor their own services over...

This paper modifies the optimal penalty analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid as a general rule. We focus on antitrust...

This paper investigates the economic rationale in defining an essential facility also considering the evolution of competition policy decisions in US and EU. In particular, we propose a test to distinguish between an abusive refusal to deal by a dominant firm and the application of the essential...

In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...

Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focusses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the...

We study empirically the price effects of upstream cartels that sell through downstream retailers to final consumers. We focus on a German coffee producer cartel that colluded under two different regimes: (i) involving wholesale prices in 2003 and (ii) with additional resale price maintenance...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...