This study examines the problem that a central bank may face after exiting a monetary quantitative easing policy. It develops a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank, which finds that if the bank needs to absorb a substantial amount of excess reserves when exiting, the monetary...

During and after the Great Recession, the European Central Bank adopted unconventional monetary policies that are more or less uncontroversial in the literature. By contrast, its quantitative easing (QE) program that started in 2015 is highly disputed. The article evaluates the pros and cons of...

In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank...

In response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments. We investigate if one of these, purchases of long-term government debt, could be a valuable addition to conventional short-term interest rate policy...

We study the impact of the publication of central bank's macroeconomic projections on the dynamic properties of an economy where: (i) private agents have incomplete information and form their expectations using recursive learning algorithms, (ii) the short-term nominal interest rate is set as a...

We study the impact of the publication of central banks' macroeconomic projections on the dynamic properties of an economy where (i) private agents have incomplete information and form their expectations using recursive learning algorithms; (ii) the short-term nominal interest rate is set as a...

This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. Forward guidance and the credibility of the central bank are uniquely modeled by utilizing a game-theoretic evolutionary framework. We estimate credibility for...

This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. Forward guidance and the credibility of the central bank are uniquely modeled by utilizing a game-theoretic evolutionary framework. We estimate credibility for...