How should firms be incentivized to adopt new technologies when the technical merits and spillovers of such technologies are uncertain? We show that, when information is dispersed but exogenous, efficiency can be induced with simple (constant) subsidies. When, instead, firms must also be...

Organisation capital is one of the key intangible assets of firms, driving innovation and firm performance. Measuring this asset has been notoriously difficult, however. Differently to other intangible assets, firms do not build up organisation capital primarily by monetary investment but rather...

This paper looks at the channels through which intangible assets affect productivity. The econometric analysis exploits a new dataset on intangible investment (INTAN-Invest) in conjunction with EUKLEMS productivity estimates for 10 EU member states from 1998 to 2007. We find that (a) the...

This paper looks at the channels through which intangible assets affect productivity. The econometric analysis exploits a new dataset on intangible investment (INTAN-Invest) in conjunction with EUKLEMS productivity estimates for 10 EU member states from 1998 to 2007. We find that (a) the...

The impact of ICT (information and communication technology) on economic performance has been the subject of academic research for several decades, and despite the remarkable and significant innovation in computer technology, usage, and investments, only a small growth in productivity was...

We study optimal subsidies for renewable energy (RE) generation to internalize external benefits from intertemporal learning-by-doing spillovers, taking into account increasing marginal costs at the industry level due to limited availability of sites suitable for RE. We find that the optimal RE...

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social...

We consider a symmetric three-stage game played by a pair of regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technology effects. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. The production process generates pollution characterized by a fixed emission/output ratio, and cross-borders. Firms...