I study organizations in which agents are connected through a fixed, un-directed, and unweighted network, and work collectively to produce a team output. Besides choosing own effort that contributes directly to the team output, agents can also exert helping effort to their network neighbors so...

In this paper, I document three stylized facts on leaders, institutions, and re-election incentives, using cross-country data: (1) in democracies, the positive relationship between leaders' performance and their capability is significantly less pronounced in their last term, when they do not...

In this paper, I study a principal-multiagent model where the principal adopts the relative performance evaluation (RPE) as the compensation strategy, and where agents are connected in an information network. The ability of each agent is private information, but adjacent agents in the...

I study the optimal compensation scheme in organizations in Shi (2020), in which agents connected in a network are endowed with the same ability, and work collectively to produce a team output. Connected agents can help neighbors to reduce the disutility of working. For any given network...

In this paper, I study a principal-multiagent model in which the principal adopts relative performance evaluation (RPE) as the compensation scheme, and agents are connected in an information network. The ability of each agent is private information, but adjacent agents in the information network...

In this paper, I examine the role of firm lobbying in shaping the structure of US production networks, and its implications for misallocation in production networks across space. Using several instrumental variable strategies, I establish that firms that lobby have more buyers and suppliers, and...