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We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (e.g., the IMF) and a country has for optimal (conditional) reform design. The main result is that the informational advantage of the country must be strictly greater than the advantage of the multilateral in order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850746
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We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003908576
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937709
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008778376
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810344
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003680650
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876384
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003813630
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248180