headquarters maximize total expected firm returns by providing managers incentives based on firm equity and divisional profits. The … costly to provide, managers with larger spillovers should receive higher equity incentives. The return-maximizing incentives … also encourage greater cooperation from managers with riskier divisional performance and have useful implications for …

rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and … in the reputation costs observed after a restatement, such that managers only reduce future bias if the observed cost of … based on more restatements. Our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve …

explicitly evaluate managers relative to peer performance are associated with: (1) the transparency of mandatory disclosure; (2 … the two depends critically on whether managers compete with peers for market prices or accounting numbers. We further show …. Collectively, our findings suggest that managerial incentives can motivate managers to abandon the novel “disclosure substitution …