Prospect theory (PT) is the dominant descriptive theory of decision making under risk today. For the modeling of choices, PT relies on a psychologically founded separation of risk attitudes into attitudes towards outcomes, captured in a value function; and attitudes towards probabilities,...

We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...

We present a theory of context-dependent risk preferences under which within-state payoff comparisons and regret aversion shape decisions. Defining the attraction and compromise effect in reference to a state-space-based description of the choice problem, we show that our theory can account for...

We derive the optimal portfolio choice for an investor who behaves according to Cumulative Prospect Theory. The study is done in a one-period economy with one risk-free asset and one risky asset, and the reference point corresponds to the terminal wealth arising when the entire initial wealth is...

Probabilistic preference models predict that a subject makes different choices with different probabilities in repeatedly experiments with the same stimuli. This paper explains why. First, we prove that a gamble is a statistical ensemble or sample function of a random field with canonical...

In Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) domain, there are two types of mixtures. One is an ex-ante mixture, or a lottery on acts. The other is an ex-post mixture, or a state-wise mixture of acts. These two mixtures have been assumed to be indifferent under the Reversal of Order axiom. However, we...

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom...

Raiffa (1961) criticizes ambiguity-averse preferences by claiming that hedging is possible with randomization of choices. We argue that the timing of randomization is crucial for hedging. Ex-ante randomizations, which are randomizations before a state is realized, could provide only ex-ante...

We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is prompted to abandon her prior. However, potential posteriors may induce her to take actions that generate a lower utility in some states than actions induced by her prior. These losses...

Attitudes toward risk underlie virtually every important economic decision an individual makes. In this experimental study, I examine how introducing a time delay into the execution of an investment plan influences individuals' risk preferences. The field experiment proceeded in three stages: a...