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A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137661
We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player's ex-post preferences over outcomes to depend on opponents' actions. We show that preference rationalizability is invariant to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099387
We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050649
We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984162
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The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068458
We characterize two sorts of stochastic choice rules in which the agent makes current decisions using a forward-looking value function that takes future randomizations into account. Both sorts of rules generalize logistic choice, and are equivalent to it in static problems. The rules differ in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075807
We extend the dual-self model to include altruistic preferences. This explains (1) why people may have preferences for equality in the laboratory but not in the field, (2) why intermediate donations may occur in dictator games, (3) why cognitive load and time pressure may increase giving, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006085