Overwhelming evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that, in simple discrimination tasks (determining what is louder, longer, brighter, or even which number is larger) humans make more mistakes and decide more slowly when the stimuli are closer along the relevant scale. We investigate to...

Influential economic approaches as random utility models or quantal-response equilibria assume a monotonic relation between error rates and choice difficulty or "strength of preference", in line with widespread evidence from discrimination tasks in psychology and neuroscience. However, while the...

Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show...

Influential economic approaches as random utility models or quantal-response equilibria assume a monotonic relation between error rates and choice difficulty or "strength of preference", in line with widespread evidence from discrimination tasks in psychology and neuroscience. However, while the...

Do choices feed back into and alter preferences? Widespread evidence arising in psychology and neuroscience shows that preferences change in response to own choices, a phenomenon typically explained through cognitive dissonance. The evidence, however, presents serious shortcomings casting doubts...

Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice frequencies and "strength of preference," in line with widespread evidence from the cognitive sciences, which also document an inverse relation to response times. However, for economic decisions...