-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Pareto optimal solution is strategy-proof if and only if the strong core correspondence is essentially single-valued, and the … solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation … games when the strong core correspondence is not necessarily essentially single-valued. I show that for the preference …

optimal solution is strategy-proof if and only if the strong core correspondence is essentially single-valued, and the … solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation … games when the strong core correspondence is not necessarily essentially single-valued. I show that for the preference …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a … matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial …