Beliefs are a central determinant of behavior. Recent models assume that beliefs about or the anticipation of future consumption have direct utilityconsequences. This gives rise to informational preferences, i.e., preferences over the timing and structure of information. Using a novel and...

Beliefs are a central determinant of behavior. Recent models assume that beliefs about or the anticipation of future consumption have direct utility-consequences. This gives rise to informational preferences, i.e., preferences over the timing and structure of information. Using a novel and...

We measure a specific form of other-regarding behavior, costly cooperation with an anonymous other, among 645 subjects at a trucker training program in the Midwestern US. Using subjects' second-mover strategy in a sequential form of the Prisoners' Dilemma, we categorize subjects as: Free Rider,...

I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...

This paper studies a problem of choice under uncertainty in which a decision-maker's (DM) choices randomly map to consumption outcomes. The primitive is a binary relation on menus, where a menu is a set of possible ex post outcomes. After the DM selects a menu, nature (not the DM) makes a...

The economic concept of the second-best involves the idea that multiple simultaneous deviations from a hypothetical first-best optimum may be optimal once the first-best itself can no longer be achieved, since one distortion may partially compensate for another. Within an evolutionary framework,...