Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …