We commonly think of information as an instrument for better decisions, yet evidence suggests that people often decline free information in non-strategic scenarios. This paper provides a theory for how a dynamically-consistent decision maker can be averse to partial information as a consequence...

Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behav- ior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both...

We study the heritability of risk, uncertainty, and time preferences using a field experiment with a large sample of adult twins. We also offer a meta-analysis of existing findings. Our field study introduces a novel empirical approach that marries behavioral genetics with structural...

We consider two semiparametric models for the weight function in a bias sample model. The object of our interest parametrizes the weight function, and it is either Euclidean or non Euclidean. One of the models discussed in this paper is motivated by the estimation the mixing distribution of...

We investigate an extension of Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya's (2004) treatment of the evolution of preference to more general, possibly non-expected utility preferences. Along the lines of their analysis we consider a population of types that is repeatedly and randomly matched to play the mixed...

Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In this paper, we characterize dynamically consistent update rules for preference models satisfying ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to...

This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in the formation of preferences for public goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use simplified heuristics based on the positions of familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and to cast a vote in line...

We address a basic diffculty with incorporating fairness into standard utilitarian choice theories. Standard utilitarian theories evaluate lotteries according to the (weighted) utility over ?nal outcomes and assume in particular that a lottery is never preferred over getting the most preferred...