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paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
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In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked's criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social...
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We measure a specific form of other-regarding behavior, costly cooperation with an anonymous other, among 645 subjects at a trucker training program in the Midwestern US. Using subjects' second-mover strategy in a sequential form of the Prisoners' Dilemma, we categorize subjects as: Free Rider,...
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laboratory experiments with 645 subjects at a trucker training program in the Midwestern US. The experiment use a version of the …There is by now ample evidence from laboratory experiments that individuals exhibit "prosocial" or "other …). In this paper we address this question by using a measure of costly cooperation elicited in a laboratory experiment to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434284
Betrayal aversion has been operationalized as the evidence that subjects demand a higher risk premium to take social risks compared to natural risks. This evidence has been first shown by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) using an adaptation of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism (BDM, Becker et al....
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