This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might...

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum...

This paper examines ex post subsidies as a means of enforcing market share targets. Subsidies set after firms make their strategic decisions are shown to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices. These effects are stronger when targets, and hence, subsidies, are specified on a...

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum...

This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might...