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Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

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Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zarzuelo, José M. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 143-156

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...

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