Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game...

Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game...

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...