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, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link-convexity …-free communication structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). We introduce the notion of link-convexity … is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041728
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
We introduce the two-step average tree value for transferable utility games with restricted cooperation represented by undirected communication graphs or hypergraphs. The solution can be considered as an alternative for both the average tree solution for graph games and the average tree value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828766
models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731198
commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and … Core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152573
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532