Similar Search Results

On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889

Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games

McLean, Richard P. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2077-2120). 2002

This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490

A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907407

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

Brink, René van den; Pinter, Miklos - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722981

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games with Suspended Realizations of Threats

Cao, Zhigang - 2014

The Hart-and-Mas-Colell bargaining model [Hart and Mas-Colell (2010). “Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games.” Journal of the European Economics Association, 8, 7-33], which is based on strategic form games, is a very promising model possessing many beautiful features....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066306

A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907400

Essentiality of degree r in cooperative games with transferable utility

Wang, Haoyu - 2021

-essential games, are shown to have a nonempty core. We give a recursive description of the core. Moreover, it is shown that the core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314021

Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors

Platz, Trine T.; Hamers, Herbert; Quant, Marieke - 2011

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181798

On the 1-Nucleolus for classes of cooperative games

Estévez-Fernández, A.; Borm, P.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.; … - 2015

This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297

Computation of the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure

Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2008

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last