models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other … illustrate these network structures by applying them to cooperative games with restricted cooperation. …

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are …-handed influence. The interactions are modeled as cooperative games with a continuum of players. In general, the continuum consists of … framework for mathematical analysis, and approximates the results for large finite games well. Also, it enables a unified view …

portfolio by studying transferable utility cooperative games: risk allocation games. We show that the class of risk allocation … games coincides with the class of totally balanced games. As a limit case the aggregate portfolio can have the same payoff … in all states of nature. We prove that the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with …

We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative solution. For such … ; Simple games ; Top coalition property …

core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same … defines the class. Application of this general theorem to the class of convex games yields an alternative proof of the Shapley … of TU games on which the core correspondence is additive (even linear). For the case of convex games we prove that the …

portfolios' realization vectors, risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversification … benefits of the various portfolios? Understanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable, efficient, and fair … allocations of risk. We show that the class of risk allocation and totally balanced games coincide, hence a stable allocation of …

The Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard …

show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex. -- transferable utility games ; uncertainty ; Weak Sequential …