Showing 1 - 10 of 321
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its … subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This … large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108817
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value … all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of … N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on … commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494469
models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731198
uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on … commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and … Core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152573
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377258
coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this … nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242