results in reputation free-riding. We show that declaring one person responsible can overcome this problem but only if all …

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and … participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that …

lower participation of shareholders with popular preferences (free-rider effect) relative to that of those with unpopular … preferences (underdog effect). We illustrate these strategic effects in a rational choice model in which the voting participation …

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and … participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that …

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and … participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that …