Showing 1 - 9 of 9
This paper uses data from a controlled laboratory environment to study the impact of transparency (i.e., complete information versus incomplete information) and repeated interactions on the level of trust and trustworthiness in an investment game setting. The key findings of the study are that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245041
Prior experimental studies provide evidence that the levels of trust and reciprocity are highly susceptible to individuals’ preferences towards payoffs, prior experience, capacity to learn more about personal characteristics of each other and social distance. The objective of this study is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245044
This paper uses laboratory mechanism design in an investment environment to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution decision on the level of trust and trustworthiness. One of the key findings is that the empowerment of investors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531401
In a laboratory-controlled environment we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency (complete over incomplete information) and empowerment on trust (investment by a principal) and trustworthiness (reciprocal behavior of an agent). We implement a simple two-person investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699611
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380078
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703972
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439844
In a laboratory-controlled environment we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency (complete over incomplete information) and empowerment on trust and trustworthiness. We implement a simple version of the standard two-person investment game in a repeated game context with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010869662
This paper uses a controlled laboratory environment and a two-person investment game in a multi-period setting to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution on trust and trustworthiness. Two forms of vetoes are tested: the first is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577299