We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the … increases, then there is a non-empty subset of firms and the set of workers they are assigned to under the F - optimal stable … matching, such that given any stable matching for the old two-sided matching problem and any stable matching for the new one …

We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the … increases, then there is a non-empty subset of firms and the set of workers they are assigned to under the F optimal stable … matching, such that given any stable matching for the old two-sided matching problem and any stable matching for the new one …

that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic … structure of the set of stable outcomes. …

that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic … structure of the set of stable outcomes. …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable … set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable … set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable …

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral … matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching …

the idea that the absence of rematching conveys no further information. When an allocation is not stable under the status … to rematch, accompanied by information updating, will converge with probability one to an allocation that is stable under …