We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

viewpoint, we extend a somewhat flexible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove …-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm …'s matching model of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to implement and systematically compare …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks …. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When …

constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of … elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining …

nonunionized firms. However, little research has been devoted to examining the implications of ESOPs for collective bargaining or … involve a strike. We examine these predictions using U.S. bargaining data from 1970 to 1995. The data suggest that ESOPs do … improved bargaining efficiency, we find that the announcement of a union ESOP leads to a 50 percent larger stock market …

The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports … an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …