State borders create a discontinuous tax treatment of retail sales. In a Nash game, local tax rates will be higher on the low-state-tax side of a border. Local taxes will decrease from the nearest high-tax border and increase from the low-tax border. Using driving time from state borders and all...

This paper assesses the impacts of the 2017 tax reform act on U.S. competitiveness in terms of changes in incentives for U.S. domestic corporate investment and the taxation of U.S.-headquartered companies and their foreign subsidiaries relative to foreign-headquartered companies. The reduction...

This paper examines the effects of state corporate income taxes on the location of foreign direct investment, taking into account the state governments' behavior when setting taxes. Ignoring the tax setting behavior of states may bias the estimate of the tax effects on foreign direct investment....

Oates' (1972) decentralization theorem holds that local governments will do a superior job at providing the efficient quantity of public goods. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that "the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in the...

With the advent of the economic and monetary union in the European Union (EU), the economic landscape of the EU will bear a striking resemblance to that of the United States in terms of fundamental attributes such as the freedom of internal movements of individuals, capital, and goods within the...

We develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin-based and a destination-based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion. In the presence of evasion, jurisdictions will give cross-border shoppers tax preferential treatment, thus not fully...

The paper analyzes the conditions under which the smaller of two otherwise identical countries prefers the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to a situation of fully harmonized tax rates. A standard two-country model of capital tax competition is extended by allowing for transaction costs,...

This paper quantifies the unequal welfare effects of tax competition. I derive the optimal tax and transfer schedules in a free mobility union composed of countries that can either compete or set a uniform federal tax rate. In the absence of fiscal coordination, governments internalize that any...

This paper contributes to the small empirical literature that attempts to estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with other national governments. After presenting a simple theoretical model, we estimate reaction functions for European countries for a pure Nash model...

We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout...