We study two-sided matching where one side (colleges) can make monetary transfers (offer stipends) to the other (students). Colleges have fixed budgets and strict preferences over sets of students. One different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows...

We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Females bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Moreover,...

We study the interdependency between two markets, where the first involves offering production capacity, while on the second actual production is sold. The key issue is that the expected product market outcome determines the opportunity cost for bidding at the capacity market while the capacity...

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid...

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...

We assess the quality of opening and closing prices for Nasdaq stocks by examining the effect that opening and closing call auctions (introduced in 2004) have had on price formation. Our use of measurement intervals of one minute or less sharpens the picture of intra-day volatility...

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...

We assess the quality of opening and closing prices for Nasdaq stocks by examining the effect that opening and closing call auctions (introduced in 2004) have had on price formation. Our use of measurement intervals of one minute or less sharpens the picture of intra-day volatility...

This paper empirically evaluates two possible sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and that encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters...

We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple leader-follower game. We then explicitly derive the primary dealer's (follower) strategic choice of bids as a function of its customer's (leader) bids and show that an increase...