Horizontal shareholding exists when significant shareholders have stock in horizontal competitors. (It is often imprecisely called "common shareholding," but that term can also apply when shareholders own stock in two noncompeting corporations. It differs from "cross-shareholding," which...

This Article shows that new economic proofs and empirical evidence provide powerful confirmation that, even when horizontal shareholders individually have minority stakes, horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. The new economic proofs show that,...

Both in US antitrust and EU competition policy a development to a broader appli-cation of rule of reason instead of per se rules can be observed. In the European discussion the attempt to base competition policy on a more economic approach is mainly viewed as im-proving the economic analysis in...

Mature antitrust regimes typically prioritize two main enforcement goals: deterrence and compensation of those injured by anti-competitive conduct. The simultaneous pursuit of these goals, however, creates difficulties for policymakers and enforcers that seek to strike a balance between public...

This article uses the FTC's October 2003 white paper on the U.S. patent system as the point of departure for a plenary critique of the system from an economic perspective. Taking the fresh viewpoint of "Alice in Wonderland" - an Englishwoman familiar with the Statute of Monopolies and...

U.S. districts courts have been increasingly faced with international cases that involve foreign litigants and foreign conduct. Despite an abundance of doctrinal analyses on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions involving extraterritorial civil jurisdiction, there are abysmally few empirical...

This is a chapter for the forthcoming book in West Publishing Company's Inside the Minds Series focusing on Financial Services Enforcement and Compliance (published by Aspatore Books). This chapter provides an overview of nature and current state of the markets for the equity side and debt...

The paper aims at assessing the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement. The analysis starts with an investigation of why competition is typically worth protecting followed by a collection of empirical evidence which shows that competition actually needs protection by antitrust policy in...

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports bythe U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of theconditional probabilities for...

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in...