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Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013 - Revised version

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743040

First-mover disadvantage

Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2006

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373494

Normative conflict and history dependence in repeated coordination games

Romero, Julian; Zhang, Huanren - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030557

Bilateral and community enforcement in a networked market with simple strategies

Fainmessery, Itay P.; Goldberg, David A. - 2011

We present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008908906

The minority game : how complex market dynamics arises from simple interacting agents

Shayeghi, N. - In: Bidding : types, strategies and the impact of irrationality, (pp. 205-224). 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010244154

Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property

Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 187-216

We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684929

An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games

Devetag, Giovanna; Di Guida, Sibilla; Polonio, Luca - 2013

We analyze subjects' eye movements while they make decisions in a series of one-shot games. The majority of them perform a partial and selective analysis of the payoff matrix, often ignoring the payoffs of the opponent and/or paying attention only to specific cells. Our results suggest that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009709528

Evidence of Style Gaming and the Moral Hazard Created in US Real Estate Mutual Funds

Choo, Jason - 2018

The moral hazard problem has been examined in the context of REITs (Edelstein, et al., 2010), securitized real estate (Fan, et al., 2006) and mortgage back securities (Keys, et al. 2009 and 2010; Kau, et al. 2012). Most past studies investigate moral hazard through managerial incentive, with little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936287

Survivor : three principles of economics lessons as taught by a reality television show

Karlan, Dean - In: The journal of economic education 48 (2017) 3, pp. 224-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888386

Reputation and Learning : Japanese Car Exports to the United States

Goksel, Turkmen - 2012

This paper incorporates learning and reputation building into a simple dynamic stochastic model of international trade … reputation, namely U.S. imports of Japanese cars over the period 1961-2005. Numerical simulations replicate the trade flow in a … international trade patterns. Since learning and reputation building require time, predicted short run trade patterns can be quite …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105124

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