In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union and the United States are at the optimal levels. The article does this by collecting and analyzing the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard core pricing...

This Comment is submitted to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division Public Roundtable Series on Competition and Deregulation, Third Roundtable On Anticompetitive Regulations. The Global Antitrust Institute's Competition Advocacy Program applauds the DOJ for...

Although recent international broadband penetration rankings have Congress concerned about U.S. broadband policy, these statistics should not play a large role in forming U.S. broadband policy, as they fail to take into account geographic factors, demographic factors and consumer preferences...

The choice of whether to regulate firms or to allow them to compete is key. If the demand is sufficiently inelastic, competition entails narrower allocative inefficiencies but, also, smaller expected profits and, thus, weaker incentives to invest in cost reduction. Hence, deregulation should be...

The determinants of incentive regulation are an important issue in economics. More powerful rules relax allocative distortions at the cost of lower rent extraction. Hence, they should be found where the reformer is more concerned with stimulating investments by granting higher expected profits,...