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Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre (contributor); Vukina, Tomislav (contributor) - 2005 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003284683

Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav - In: International journal of industrial organization 27 (2009) 4, pp. 489-500

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003858396

Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003401323

Long-term contracting in a changing world

Pavan, Alessandro - 2007

I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665285