This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory...

We empirically analyze the relationship between income inequality and individual preferences for public redistribution, focusing on intra-household income inequality between spouses. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find that both one's own earned income and earned...

Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less...

It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in society better protects property from expropriation. We use a model of multilateral bargaining to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players...

This work is based on a differential game proposed by Kelvin Lancaster. The game between two agents called workers and capitalists is based on the accumulation and redistribution of benefits among social classes concluding that cooperative outcomes outperform non-cooperative. This approach...

Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while...

This paper intends to make a two-fold contribution to the literature. First, it studies a political economy model of family taxation using a household economics approach to behavior; the nature of the winning policy is found to depend on whether i) the parents control their fertility or not, ii)...

This paper studies the effects of different income transfers on individual welfare, in both marriage and divorce situations, and on family decisions. We assume three generations within the family. We develop a sequential game that, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer...

We analyse a model in which families may either be “traditional” single-earner with caring for the child at home or “modern” double-earner households using market child care. Family policies may favour either the one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash for care....

We analyse a model in which families may either be “traditional” single-earner with caring for the child at home or “modern” double-earner households using market child care. Family policies may favour either the one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash for care....