Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country...

Technological development is likely to play an important role in curbing growth in greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological change in climate policy analyses. This paper studies climate policy when there are technology spillovers...

Much of the literature on international environmental agreements uses static models, although most important transboundary pollution problems involve stock pollutants. The few papers that study IEAs using models of stock pollutants do not allow for the possibility that membership of the IEA may...

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

The essential problem with the Kyoto approach is that it provides poor incentives for participation and compliance. The minimum participation clause is set at such a low level that the agreement can enter into force while limiting the emissions of less than a third of the global total. The...

There has been a recent economic literature arguing that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can have no real effect, on account of their voluntary and self-enforcing nature. This literature concludes that the terms of IEAs are the codification of the noncooperative equilibrium, and...

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers abatement cost savings under the Kyoto Protocol by allowing credits for emission reductions obtained in signatory developing countries. The paper shows that it is necessary to include technology transfers in the CDM to obtain correct incentives for...

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...

We extend the work on coalition formation in global pollution control by allowing for multiple coalitions. Equilibrium coalitions are derived under different